Ma`rifat

The division of general concepts into primary and secondary intelligibles is one of the innovations of Islamic philosophers, and over time, confusing each of these intelligibles with each other has created problems and ambiguities in Islamic philosophy. This article, with a descriptive-analytical approach, examines the confusions that occur between primary intelligibles (whatish concepts) and secondary intelligibles (logical-philosophical) in Islamic philosophy, relying on the views of Allama Misbah. From the perspective of Allama Misbah Yazdi, one of the most important reasons for many philosophical problems, including in discussions such as the verbal commonality of the concept of existence, Mulla Sadra's proof of the unity of existence, the nature of place and the number of categories, is due to the confusion of these two categories of intelligibles. By carefully analyzing these cases, the author tries to highlight the importance of this distinction in the correct understanding of philosophical issues. The aim of the article is to examine a case study and resolve the ambiguities arising from these confusions, relying on the views of Allama Misbah as an illuminating framework in Islamic philosophy.