Ma`rifat

ABSTRACT Background and Objective: Iranian society has recently faced two seemingly different crises simultaneously: on the one hand, the security event of Esfand 1404 (March 2026) involving the assassination of the Supreme Leader and military commanders, which could have acted as an "immediate trigger" for the collective mobilization of opponents to the system; on the other hand, the chronic crisis of inflation and the erosion of the national currency's value, which reached a rate of 77.2% in Ordibehesht 1405 (April-May 2026) – the highest figure since the 1979 revolution. The aim of this article is to explain the common roots of these two crises within the framework of institutional sociology and the philosophy of money. Findings: The research findings indicate that both crises are rooted in a common underlying context: "the weakening of social attachments, the erosion of institutional trust, the spread of anomie, and the collapse of the credit function of institutions (in the Simmelian sense)." Conclusion: The article concludes that the emergency cohesion established in the aftermath of the Esfand 1404 event has created a temporary window for the reconstruction of institutional trust. This window can help mitigate the "Simmelian trust crisis" in Iran's economy. A sustainable solution for curbing inflation and restoring the value of money is not achievable through monetary instruments alone; rather, it requires the "reconstruction of the social contract" and the "strengthening of institutional transparency," which are attainable by utilizing the window of emergency cohesion.